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Resumo
Este trabalho compara, do ponto de vista teórico, três sistemas universitários alternativos: o atual adotado 
pelo Brasil, no qual os alunos das universidades públicas, que são praticamente gratuitas, são escolhi-
dos através de um processo seletivo; um sistema de quotas nas universidades públicas para beneficiar 
estudantes de baixa renda; e um sistema de vouchers direcionados para estudantes de baixa renda que 
podem ser utilizados nas universidades privadas ou públicas. A comparação destes três sistemas indica 
que o último é o mais eficiente, pois gera: (i) maior qualidade da mão de obra; (ii) alocação mais eficiente 
dos recursos; e (iii)  maior mobilidade social.
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Abstract
This paper compares theoretically three alternative university systems: the current one adopted in Brazil, 
in which students who perform better in the entering exam obtain the right to attend the public univer-
sity without paying the full tuition; a system of affirmative action quotas in public universities, to benefit 
low income students; and a targeted vouchers system that can be used either to pay private or public 
university tuiton. The comparison indicates that the last system leads to: (i) a higher quality of the labor 
force; (ii) a more efficient allocation of resources; and (iii) a greater social mobility.
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1   Introduction
The Brazilian higher education sector has two important characteristics. First, the-
re is a mix of private and public universities coexisting. The fraction of students 
enrolled in private universities was equal to 74.6% in 2006.1 Second, the govern-
ment heavily subsidizes higher education by financing fully (or almost fully) public 
universities' tuitions. For instance, an individual whose income per capita is equal 
to the country's income per capita and whose child studies in a public university 
receives a transfer from the government aproximatelly equal to 51% of his income. 
In contrast, the same number for Argentina, South Korea and United States are, 
respectively, equal to 16.2%, 5% and 26%.2
There are two main justifications to use government money to finance higher edu-
cation. The first one is to promote equality of opportunity by correcting the lack 
of capital markets to finance education. The second one is to produce positive 
externalities. It is not clear that the current university system is the most efficient 
to accomplish these goals.
On the one hand, the system is clearly regressive and does not promote equality of op-
portunity. It is financed through tax revenues by all individuals in the economy. The me-
chanisms to select students to attend the public universities is a very strict one in which 
only students who pass a competitive entrance exam are accepted. The system implies 
a transfer from the rich to the poor. Its beneficiaries are in general students coming from 
high income families. The reasons are obvious. Rich families' offspring receive a higher 
quality pre-university education which allows them either to finish high school or to per-
form better in the competitive entrance exams for the public universities. They choose 
the public option over the private one either because the public universities are better 
or because it is not worth " paying twice" for a better education (through tax and tuition 
in private universities). In Brazil, 76% of all public expenditures in higher education are 
directed to the top 20% richest families in the population. Only 3% are directed to the 60% 
poorest families.
On the other hand, the presence of externalities may not justify the current system. First, 
it is not necessarily optimum to subsidize every student at the same rate. Mostly important, 
given the financial difficulties of the governments and the potential alternative uses 
of the money, it is desirable to use more efficiently the public resources.
Given the inadequacy of the current system, it is worth analyzing other options. 
This paper's objective is to compare theoretically three systems. The first one mi-
1 See Andrade et al (2009).
2 These numbers were extracted from Veloso and Ferreira (2006).
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mics the current system and it is called free tuition regime. It is assumed that the 
public universities are tuition free. The students who obtain the highest scores in 
the entrance exams can attend the public universities. The second one is the targe-
ted vouchers system. Under this scheme, public tuitions are not free. Low income 
students receive vouchers that can be used either to pay private or public tuition. 
The others have to sponsor fully their higher education.3 The third regime is quo-
tas. Under this option, public universities are tuition-free. However, it is guaranteed 
the admission of a certain number of students from the target groups (coming from 
low income families) in public universities. These beneficiaries replace students 
from non-target groups who would have the right to attend the tuition-free public 
universities in the free tuition regime. Such a system has been adopted in some 
Brazilian public universities and the government has plans to expand it to all federal 
universities.
The analysis suggests that the targeted vouchers system is the best among the three 
examined. It produces the highest quality of the labor force, the greatest social mobility 
and the most efficient allocation of total resources (private and public) in higher education. 
Its advantage is related to the fact that it directs public resources only to those individuals 
who really need financial support to attend an university.
There are some papers related to this one. It adapts a framework developed by 
Caucutt and Kumar (2003), which analyses the effects of increasing higher educa-
tion subsidies in the US on inequality, welfare and efficiency. They do not examine 
the effects of quotas and targeted vouchers. Chen and West (2000) studies the 
median voter choice between the universal and selective vouchers but in primary 
and secondary education. Andrade (2004) compares quotas with the free-tuition 
regime. The main novelty of this paper is to analyze the targeted voucher regime, 
which turns out to be the most efficient one.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the structure of the mo-
del. The following section describes the competitive equilibrium in each system. 
Section 4 compares the efficiency of the three regimes (tuition free, quotas and 
targeted vouchers). Section 5 discusses how robust the results are to some changes 
in the structure of the model. The final section concludes.
3 To my knowledge, there is no voucher system in the higher education sector. Pro-poor voucher 
plans operate in some countries (e.g., Colombia, Guatemala, the United States), but only in 
lower levels of education, not in universities. Chile is the only example of a nationwide schools 
voucher system, in the line proposed by Friedman (1962), not selective. For different funding 
mechanisms for higher education in the world, see Albrecht and Ziderman (1992).
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2   Model
The model employs a two-period economy. There are two types of families, which 
differ by the parent's level of human capital. At time t = 0, parent has either a high 
or a low level of human capital. Each parent works, receives wages, decides whether 
to send his child to university, consumes, and dies. At time t = 1, the child becomes 
a worker with high or low level of human capital, depending on the educational 
decision of his parent, receives a wage, and consumes. The measure of each gene-
ration (and the number of workers in each period) is constant and is normalized to 
one. Let  and  be the fraction of individuals, respectively, with high and low 
levels of human capital at time t. Note that  and  are exogenously 
given, and .
As I do not model the schooling decision, it is assumed that all children have a 
school degree and are able to attend university. However, they differ in their abi-
lity to perform well at university and become an individual with a high level of 
human capital. A child with ability a who attends a private university becomes an 
individual with high or low level of human capital, respectively, with probability 
πpr(a) and (1 - πpr(a)). In the case of attending a public university, the equivalent 
probability can differ and is denoted by πpu(a). If the quality of the public university 
is greater than the private, then πpu(a) > πpr(a), ∀a. The inequality reverses if the 
opposite holds, that is, if the private university has a higher quality. This feature 
of the model limits the heterogeneity to two levels of human capital, and there-
fore to two income levels, which simplifies the analysis. If a child does not attend 
university, he has the lower level of human capital with probability equal to one. 
Let F(.) be the distribution function for ability on the support [0,1], and f(.) be the 
corresponding density function. As in Caucutt and Kumar (op. cit.), the distribution 
is identical across types and within families of the same type, and all ability draws 
are independent of each other.4 
Assumption 1: , , , , , and , 
.
The parent whose child has ability a may have three options: sending the child to 
attend the public or the private university, or alternatively, letting the child remain 
solely with a school degree. His problem can be written in the following way:
4 In this paper, the term ability includes cognitive and non-cognitive abilities. See Cunha et al. 
(2006) and Cunha and Heckman (2009) for a lenght discussion on the impact of cognitive and 
non-cognitive abilities and parent's education on the student performance, as well as early and 
late investments in education affecting many individuals' behaviors and income.
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  (1)
 
 
where τ is the income tax, b is the discount factor, wi,t  is the wage of individual 
with i level of human capital at time t, Epu is the public university tuition, Epr is 
the private university tuition, V is the voucher that can be used either in private or 
public university, and the utility function u has the usual properties. The university 
tuition can be seen as the cost per student in terms of units of consumption. The 
first term within the parenthesis in the above problem indicates the public univer-
sity option, which may be available to the family.5 At t = 0, the family receives its 
wage net of taxes, may have to pay the public university tuition and may receive 
vouchers to pay the child's education. It consumes and sends its child to a public 
university. At t = 1, the child becomes either a worker with high or low level of 
human capital, based on the quality of the public university, and earns his wage. 
The second term indicates the private university option, which is available to all 
families who have enough resources to pay the tuition.6,7 The difference with res-
pect to the first option is that the probability of the child becoming an individual 
with high level of human capital is now based on the quality of the private univer-
sity. The last term within the parenthesis is the option of not sending the child to 
university at all. The family pays taxes and the child becomes a worker with low 
level of human capital.
The family's problem above differs slightly depending which regime is in place: free 
tuition in public universities ( f ), quotas (q) and targeted vouchers (v). Under the 
free tuition regime, there are no vouchers and the public university tuition is free. 
Hence, Epu  and V are equal to zero. Moreover, there is a fixed number s of places 
(s<<1) in public universities. As the number of applicants is greater than s, it is 
necessary to have some form of rationing.
In Brazil, this rationing is made through exams that all applicants must take. The 
accepted students are those who achieve the highest scores. In order to mimic this 
5 See discussion below about which families have the public university option.
6 As it is assumed that there is no capital market to finance investments in education, the private 
university option is not available to those families that do not receive vouchers and whose wage 
net of taxes is lower than the private university tuition.
7 The price (cost) of private education is assumed to be fixed and equal to Epr. Thus, the number 
of students that are enrolled in the private universities is endogenously determined. Implicitly, it 
is assumed, for simplicity, that there is perfect competition in the private market for education 
with competitors having the same cost structure.
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current system of students' selection to the public universities, it is assumed that 
the students who achieve the highest scores are the ones with greater abilities. 
Hence, the s individuals with greater ability obtain the right to attend the public 
university, independently of their family's income background.8 Formally, the abi-
lity ranges of the individuals from high and low income families who acquire the 
right to attend public university under regime f  are, respectively, equal to  
and , such that: .9 Only those fami-
lies whose children obtain the right to attend the public university have the three 
options mentioned in problem (1) under the free tuition regime. The others would 
have only the last two options: either to send their children to private university or 
let them remain solely with a school degree.
Under the quota regime, as in the free tuition regime, there are no vouchers and 
the public university tuition is free ( ). The introduction of quotas into 
the system has the effect of changing the individuals who have the right to at-
tend public universities and, thus, the ability range of the individual who attend 
public universities. This change occurs formally in the following way. The c indi-
viduals with the lowest ability levels compared to other individuals of their ba-
ckground, who had the right to attend the public university and whose parents 
have a high level of human capital, lose their right to attend public universities. 
In their place, the c individuals with the highest ability levels among individuals 
of their backgrounds, who did not have the right to attend a public university and 
whose parents have a low level of human capital, acquire that right. Therefore, the 
new ability range of the individuals who attend public universities under regime 
q are the following. It becomes equal to  and , respectively, for 
those individuals whose parents have high and low level of human capital. The 
abilities  and  are obtained, respectively, from the following equations: 
.10 This set-up indicates that, when quotas 
are introduced, some high income families lose their right to send their children to 
public university, which are transferred to some low income families. In this way, 
this feature of the model tries to mimic the types of quotas that has been introdu-
ced in Brazil, which are intended to benefit either black or public schools students 
who in general are from low income families.11 Hence, with quotas, there is a new 
8 With assumption 2 below, the s individuals with the highest abilities actually decide to attend 
the public universities under the free tuition regime.
9 Note that  .
10 Note that  .
11 For more details, see Andrade (2004).
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set of families whose children have the right to attend the public university. They 
are the ones now with the three options in problem (1). The other families can 
choose from only the other two alternatives: private universities or no university.
Under the targeted voucher system, students have to pay tuition to attend public 
universities. In addition, students from low income families may receive vouchers 
that can be used to pay full tuition either in private or public university. To simplify 
the analysis, I assume that, when tuition are charged in public universities, private 
and public tuitions are equal (Epr=Epu=E). For those families who receive vouchers, 
V is positive and equal to E. For the others, V is equal to zero and E is positive. It is 
important to define which low income families are eligible to receive the vouchers. 
They are the ones with the highest ability levels among those families who do not 
send their children to attend university without the financial aid from the gover-
nment. It is important to emphasize that the targeted voucher system is different 
from the other two because it directs public resources only to those families who 
really need financial support to provide an university degree to their children.12 I 
define the ability range of the individuals who receive vouchers as  . Total 
number of vouchers distributed are equal to s. Hence, . The 
number of places available in the public universities are still the same and equal to 
s. If public universities face excess demand, I assume that the individuals with the 
highest abilities have the right to attend them. However, the places available in the 
public universities may not be filled under the targeted voucher system as they are 
not free anymore and their quality may be lower than the private ones.
Recall that, independently of which regime is in place, each family has to pay an in-
come tax (τ) at t = 0. Income tax are the sole source of revenues to the government. 
Under the free tuition or quota regimes, public university students do not pay 
tuition which is financed by the government. Assuming that the cost per student 
is equal to E, government expenditures are equal to sE. Under the voucher system, 
s vouchers are distributed and each one has a face value equal to E. This amount is 
sufficient to pay s full tuitions either in the private or public university. Total gover-
nment expenditures are also equal to sE. As a result, the model is constructed in a 
way that total expenditures by the government are the same in all regimes, which 
12 The targeted voucher system used in the model is certainly not the most efficient one. In par-
ticular, it could have been proposed one in which targeted families with lower ability children 
receive more generous vouchers. As a result, more children would attend university as it is cle-
arly not necessary to pay the full tuition to " convince" the targeted families with the relatively 
brighest children to choose the university option. Nonetheless, for simplicity, I use a targeted 
voucher system in which all recipients receive vouchers with the same face value. For a further 
discussion on different voucher systems and its impacts, see Neal (2002) and Ladd (2002).
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makes the three regimes comparable. Government's budget constraint, which has 
to be in equilibrium, is the following:  
 
There is a single non-storable good in the economy produced by firms operating in 
a competititve market. There is no physical capital in the economy. The only inputs 
in the production process are the two types of labor, with high and low levels of 
human capital. The single technology, which has constant returns to scale, produces 
goods that can be consumed or invested in education and is as follows:
 
where ; ;  and  are, respectively, the number of individuals 
with high and low levels of human capital employed in the production process at 
time t. The idea behind this production function is the following. Workers with 
high level of human capital provide two distinct productive services, physical effort 
(" brawn" ) and mental effort (" brains" )" . Workers with low level of human capital 
is capable of providing only the former. In other words, in order to be able to exe-
cute more sophisticated tasks the individual must acquire a higher level of human 
capital.13 It is easy to check that the greater is the fraction of individuals with high 
level of human capital, the greater is total production. Moreover, as each type of 
labor is paid its marginal product,  wh,t is always greater than wl,t.
3   Competitive Equilibrium
This section discusses the competitive equilibrium of the model under the three 
different regimes: free ( f), quotas (q) and targeted vouchers (v). I restrict the analy-
sis in any regime to equilibria that incorporate two features. First, families always 
use the option offered by the government if available to them, either to use their 
right to attend the public university (in the free tuition or quota regimes) or the 
vouchers in the best available university. Second, there is also private investment 
in education. In other words, the expected skill premium, resulted from the sole 
public expenditures in education in any regime, is large enough to give incentives 
for at least some families to invest their own resources in private education.
13 Andrade (1998) uses the same production function, which is a simplified version from the one 
employed by Stokey (1996).
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The reason for adopting these two features in the model is that they are charac-
teristics of the system in the countries mentioned in the introduction. In general, 
individuals opt to attend public universities because they are (almost) free in order 
to avoid paying twice for education (through tax and tuition in private universities). 
It may occur even if a private university has a higher quality.14 Moreover, there is 
a mix of private and public universities coexisting. These characteristics are likely 
to remain if the two alternative regimes discussed here, the quotas and targeted 
voucher regimes, are introduced.
Let  be the wage of worker type i (i  = h, l) at time t = 1 if the s individuals 
with the right to attend public university under the quota regime choose the pu-
blic option and there is no private investment in education. Recall that the lowest 
ability level of all individuals who acquire the right to attend public university 
under the quota regime is equal to . The following assumption guarantees that 
the differences in quality between both types of universities are not large enough 
to justify the investment E in private education under the quota regime when the 
public option is available:
Assumption 2:15  and for any a, , 
 
It is interesting to mention what this assumption implies to the equilibrium under 
the free tuition regime. As mentioned in the previous section, quota changes the 
individuals who have the right to attend public universities, reducing their average 
quality. Hence, without any private investment in education, the skill premium is 
certainly lower with quotas in comparison with the free tuition regime. As a result, 
if it does not justify the investment in private education in the quota regime when 
the public option is available, it must also hold in the free tuition regime.
In the vouchers regime, obviously, the recipient families always opt to send their 
children to the university with higher quality. The others alternatives (either no 
university or the one with lower quality) become redundant.
14 Using the notation of the model, even if , ∀a.
15 Obviously, if it is not worth to high income families to choose the private option when the pu-
blic one is available, the same holds for low income families. Moreover, if low income families 
do not have enough resources to pay for private education (that is, if (1-τ) w0.l < E), they do not 
invest in private education. Finally, note that having chosen the public option without any private 
investment in education, the families certainly continue choosing the public option when there 
are also private investments in education in the economy as the skill premium is lower.
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Thus, as pointed out above, the type of equilibrium that is the focus of this paper 
is the one in which the families always use the option offered by the government. 
Formally, the following holds in the equilibria examined. Under the free tuition re-
gime, the ability ranges of the indivuals from high and income families who actually 
attend the public universities are, respectively, equal to  and . Under 
the quota regime, the corresponding ability ranges are  and . Under 
the targeted voucher regime, the ability range of the individuals from low income 
families who use the vouchers is .
The following assumption is sufficient to restrict the analysis to equilibria in which 
there is private investment in education under the free tuition and quotas regimes:
Assumption3:16 , for 
 and if  for .
Some of high income families whose children do not have the right to attend pu-
blic university are made better off by investing in private education instead of not 
sending their children to university. The same is valid to low income families as 
long as their net wage of tax is greater than the university tuition ( ). 
Otherwise, there is no private investment in education made by low income fami-
lies as there is no capital market to finance education in the model.
Let  be the wage to worker type i (i = h,l) at time t = 1 if the s individuals who 
receive vouchers attend the university with the highest quality. Recall that  is 
the lowest ability level of all individuals who receive vouchers. The following is a 
sufficient assumption to guarantee that there is private investment in education 
under the targeted voucher regime.
Assumption 4:17
 
 
for  and if  for .
16 Note that this assumption guarantees that there is private investment in education under the 
quota regime. As the skill premium is higher when there is no private investment in education 
under the free tuition regime, it follows that there is also private investment in education under 
the free tuition regime.
17 The economic intuition behind this condition is equivalent to the one in assumption 3.
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I now turn to the definition and the proof of existence and uniqueness of the equi-
librium under regime j ( j=f,q,v):
Definition 1: Given s, c, Epu, Epr, E, V and , a competitive equilibrium under 
regime j is characterized by , , ,  and  ( ), and  and  
under regime v, such that: (i) given wages, firms maximize profits; (ii) the labor market 
clears, that is,  and  ( ); (iii)  is obtained from the 
following equation for s, ; (iv)  and  
are obtained from the following equations for c, ; 
(v) given wages, s, c, , , E and V,  and  solve the university decision 
problem of family i in () under regime j such that individuals with ability ranges 
 and  attend, respectively, public and private universities.(v) 
 and  are obtained, respectively, from the following equations,   
and ; (vi) under regime v, individuals from low income families 
with ability range  attend the type of university with higher quality; (vii) 
the government's budget constraint is in equilibrium; and (viii) the law of motion 
for the variables  ( ) and , which are, respectively, given by:
  (2)
 
 and 
  (3)
 
 
Proposition 1: Under regime j ( j = f,q,v), there exists a competitive equilibrium 
and it is unique.
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Before turning to the comparison of the regimes, it is worth summarizing some 
characteristics of the equilibria examined in this paper. First, all families whose 
children have the right to attend public universities or receive vouchers accept the 
benefits provided by the government. Second, some high income families do pay 
tuition to attend private university. The same is valid to low income families if 
they are not credit constrained. Otherwise,  ( j = f,q,v), that is, there 
is no private investment in education from low income families. Finally, one im-
portant implication from the equilibrium under the targeted voucher regime is the 
following:
Corollary 1: If , then .
The above corollary shows one obvious result: public university would not exist if 
a voucher system is introduced and the private university has a higher quality.18 A 
voucher's recipient would be able to choose a place either in the private or public 
university and would certainly opt to the former one. The non-recipients devoided 
from the free tuition alternative in the public universities would also choose the 
private alternative. This prospect suggests that a government policy based on a tar-
geted voucher regime may suffer opposition from members of low quality public 
universities.19
4   Efficiency Across Regimes
This section compares the efficiency of the regimes: free tuition ( f ), quotas (q) 
and targeted voucher (v). In order to perform this analysis, I use four different 
indicators: (i) the efficiency of public expenditures in education; (ii) the efficiency 
of the total, private and public, expenditures in education; (iii) the modulus of 
the difference in the threshold abilities behavior of both types of families; (iv) the 
quality of the labor force.
Before comparing the regimes, it is important to define formally all indicators.20 
The first indicator is the efficiency of the public expenditures in education. It is 
measured by the ratio of the number (measure) of students who have their uni-
versity education financed by the government and turn out to be individuals with 
a high level of human capital to the public expenditures in education. Obviously, 
a greater ratio indicates more efficient public investments as it is desirable to have 
more qualified indiviuals per amount spent. Formally, this indicator is equal to: 
18 When πpu(a)=πpr(a), families are indifferent from sending their children to private or public 
universities. In this case, it is not clear if public universities would coexist with private ones.
19 For a further discussion on the effects of the targeted voucher system, see Andrade (2009).
20 Caucutt and Kumar (2003) and Andrade (2004) use similar indicators.
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and, 
 
 
respectively, for j ( j = f,q) and for the targeted vouchers system. In the expression 
for , I is an indicator function that can assume two values: 0 if the low inco-
me families are credit constrained and the public universities' quality is at least as 
good as the private ones; and 1 otherwise. In the first case, some of the vouchers' 
recipients have the right to attend the public university and make this option. These 
are the students coming from low income families who also have the right to attend 
the public university under the free tuition regime. The others have only the private 
alternative. In the second case, the beneficiaries use the vouchers to attend private 
universities because either they are not qualified to attend the public universities 
or the private universities are better.
The second indicator is the efficiency of total expenditures in education. It is 
measured by the ratio of the number (measure) of students who turn out to be 
individuals with a high level of human capital to the total (private plus public) 
expenditures in education. Obviously, for the same reason as in the previous indi-
cator, a greater ratio indicates more efficient investments. Formally, this indicator 
is equal to ( j = f,q,v): 
 
The third indicator captures which system is more capable of allocating the best 
talents, individuals with the greatest abilities, to attend university, independen-
tly of their family's income's background. It can be seen as a measure of social 
mobility. Hence, it is interesting to compare the ability of the least able indi-
vidual with a high income family background who attends university with the 
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correspondent one from the low income family. Formally, this indicator denoted 
by DIF is the difference of these abilities. For regime j ( j = f,q), the indicator is 
equal to . For the voucher regime, the indicator is equal to 
.
Finally, the fourth and last indicator is the quality of the labor force at time t = 1 me-
asured by the fraction of individuals with high level of human capital ( , j = f,q,v).
I now turn to the results of the comparison of the regimes in terms of efficiency.
Proposition 2:  and  ( j = f,q).
Proposition 3: There is a positive number of targeted vouchers such that 
 ( j = f,q).
The two above propositions show that the targeted voucher system is the most 
efficient in three out of the four indicators analyzed. It produces a greater quality 
of the labor force (n), more social mobility (DIF), and a better allocation of the total 
resources spent in higher education (EEFto).
The intuition behind these results is the following. With vouchers, public resources 
are not wasted in providing higher education to individuals who have enough re-
sources on their own and would use them to pay the full tuition if the free option 
is not available. This waste occurs either in the free tuition or the quota system.
Thus, under the targeted voucher system, limited resources are directed to those 
individuals who really need financial support to attend an university. Its implica-
tions are the following. On the one hand, it reduces the relationship between the 
student's family income and his capability of attending an university. That is, it 
increases social mobility.
On the other hand, the direct effect of vouchers is to decrease the skill premium, 
as it augments the ability range of those individuals coming from low income who 
attend university. At the margin, high income families become less inclined to send 
their children to university, which tends to reduce the effect on the skill premium. 
The net effect is a skill premium under the targeted vouchers system lower than 
the ones obtained in the free tuition and quotas regimes, which indicates a greater 
quality of the labor force.
Finally, there is a positive number of targeted vouchers that can make total in-
vestments in higher education more efficient under the targeted vouchers regime 
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than the others. There is a positive number of vouchers that can be distributed 
to low income families such that in equilibrium: (i) the number of new univer-
sity students coming from low income families are exactly equal to the number 
of students coming from high income families whose families decide not to send 
their children to university anymore (due to the lower skill premium), and (ii) the 
new students (from low income families) have a higher quality than the ones who 
do not attend university anymore (from high income families). The first feature 
guarantees that the same number of students attend university with the vouchers 
system in comparison with the others regimes. The second feature indicates that 
the average ability of the students attending university under vouchers is necessa-
rily greater. Therefore, it is straighforward to show that the overall allocation of 
resources in higher education is more efficient under the vouchers regime. That is, 
 ( j = f,q).
Proposition 4: If , then  ( j = f,q) and if , 
then  may be greater, equal or lower than  ( j = f,q).
The above proposition indicates that the efficiency of the public investments in 
higher education under the targeted vouchers system is lower, in general, than in 
the other regimes. This is an expected result. As pointed out above, vouchers are 
directed to those individuals who really need financial support to attend an univer-
sity. These students are in general the ones with a lower level of ability.
However, if the quality of the private university is greater, the result can be rever-
sed. The reason is the following. When vouchers are introduced, its beneficiaries 
have, on average, a lower level of ability in comparison with students with the hi-
ghest abilities who opt for the public universities because it is free of charge under 
the quota and free tuition regimes. However, as they opt for the private universi-
ties which are better, the overall investments in education by the government can 
actually increase.
It is interesting to note the following. In comparison with other regimes, vouchers 
produce, in general, a less efficient public investiments in higher education and a 
more efficient total (private and public) investments in education. Obviously, the 
efficiency of the whole educationl sector is the more relevant variable.
5   Discussion
The model used in this paper tries to capture the main features of the Brazilian 
higher education sector. Given the stylized nature of the model, it is interesting to 
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discuss which hypothesis are crucial to reach the results and how robust they are 
if some changes in the structure of the model are introduced. It is not possible to 
intertwine this discussion with the lessons available from the empirical evidence 
on the use of vouchers in the higher education sector. The reason is that, to my 
knowledge, there is no country that had adopted such system in the higher educa-
tion sector. When appropriate, though, it is interesting to pinpoint lessons learned 
from the most notorious and studied voucher program in the world, the Chilean 
nationalwide school choice system, in order to prevent mistakes when introducing 
a targeted voucher in the higher education sector.21
First, there is one important implicit assumption in the model: public universities 
do not operate under a " soft budget constraint". It means that, in order to survive, 
they have to be efficient and attract students. Otherwise, if they lose students to 
private universities because they are not free-tuition institutions anymore and are 
relatively less efficient, they end up stop operating and have to close its doors. In 
other words, when faced with this reality, the government would not provide extra 
funds and direct subsidies to the public universities to avoid its shut down. This 
assumption is important because it generates the necessary competition between 
private and public universities in the direction to an overall increase in the quality 
of the higher education institutions as only the most efficient ones are selected by 
the students. Hence, the possible existence of  " soft budget constraints" for public 
universities is likely to mitigate the effects of the targeted voucher system in the in-
crease in the quality of the labor or in the overall efficiency of the total investments 
in higher education. In contrast, the possible existence of a " soft budget constraint" 
for the public universities is unlikely to affect the result that the targeted voucher 
system would lead to an increase in social mobility, as the resources would still be 
directed to the students coming from low income families.
In fact, there is one important lesson from the Chilean experience: the existence 
of " soft budget constraints" did not provide the correct incentive for the public 
schools. In practice, there was no competition among private and public schools. 
The reason is that public schools faced " soft budget constraints" and did not stop 
operating and closed its doors even if they lost students. Hence, the system was 
not propered designed and it should not come as a surprise the fact that it did not 
lead to the expected results in terms of increasing the education quality as discus-
21 Obviously there are important differences between the higher education and the school sectors. 
In particular, the fact that it is mandatory for students to attend school whereas it is not for an 
university. For a further discussion on this issue, see Friedman (1962). The comparions have to 
be made with cautious.
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sed above. Such mistake should be avoided when introducing the targeted voucher 
system in the Brazilian higher education sector.22
Second, there is one implicit assumption that, under the targeted voucher system a 
private university, when faced with excess demand, would select the best students 
available from the candidates. The model explicitly assumes the same for the public 
universities. These features of the model recognize the fact that a customer-input 
technology is employed in the higher education sector. The highest the quality of 
incoming students (and customers), ceteris paribus, the greatest is the quality of 
outgoing students or the quality of educational services provided by the institution. 
In great lenght, it occurs because students benefit from the interaction with others, 
the so called peer-effect.23 In recognizing the importance of students' quality in the 
production of educational services, an university impose a very selective process to 
choose the students and restrict the supply. Even if one considers the peer-effect, 
the results in our model is unlikely to suffer any change because in both systems, 
in the current system and in the proposed targeted voucher system, a meritocratic 
system prevails and the relatively best students are grouped in the relatively best 
universities. In other words, the new system does not change a characteristic of 
the current one.24
Third, the model does not include two features discussed in the literature that 
analyzes the effects of affirmative action policies. One the one hand, students 
could benefit from the presence of individuals from different races, ethnicities, 
and income's family backgrounds on universities campuses. An environment cha-
racterized by diversity, which allows the exchange of different experiences of life 
among students, could have important impacts on the students' learning experien-
ces, including a reduction in discrimination over time. One the other hand, quotas 
can make less rare the presence of role models from different races, ethnicities and 
income's family backgrounds. These individuals who are well successful in their 
careers, could serve as " examples" to younger individuals from less favorable groups 
in society, signalling to them that they can also succeed in their lives, and serving as 
22 For a review of the Chilean experience, see Gallego and Hernando (2008) and McEwan et. al 
(2008). 
23 There are mixed evidence on the recent work on peer effects in higher education. Sacerdote 
(2001) and Zimmerman (2003) find evidence of peer-effect among roomates. Arcidiano and 
Nicholson (2005) find no peer effect among medical students, while Dale and Krueger (1998) 
find mixed results.
24 The evidence on the Chilean voucher system registered a flow of the best public school students 
to private schools, a phenomenon called stratification, and a greater disparity in the quality of 
public schools vis-à-vis the private ones. When faced with excess of demand, private schools se-
lected the best students because they are easier to teach, the costs to provide education to them 
are lower and the voucher value was the same for all students. In our model, the stratification 
would not change. The same phenomenon did not occur in the voucher system in Sweeden as the 
schools had little room to decide the rules to select its students - see Sandstrom and Bergstrom 
(2005).
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an incentive for them to pursue their objectives. However, the empirical evidence 
in the United States, the country that has adopted more aggressively affirmative 
action policies, does not indicate that these factors (the diversity and the " role 
model" factors) can impact in a significant way the educational quality of higher 
education and for this reason it was not incorporated in the model.25
Finally, the model assumes that two workers, one who attend a private university 
and the another a public university, as long as they obtain a high level of human ca-
pital, are perfect substitutes in the production function. This hypothesis obviously 
simplifies the problem as it limits the heterogeneity to two levels of human capital. 
This feature of the model does not play any important role in the results. Even if 
they are complementary inputs in the production function, the introduction of the 
targeted voucher system would increase the social mobility, as the resources are 
now directed to the low income families, and the quality of the labor force (and 
the efficiency of the overall investments in education) as, at the margin, more in-
dividuals would be able to attend an university.
6   Conclusion
The Brazilian higher education sector is clearly inefficient. On the one hand, it is 
clearly regressive and does not promote equality of opportunities. On the other 
hand, it is also inefficient as it does use the available resources in way to maximize 
the quality of the labor force.
This paper indicates that there is another system that can correct some of the ina-
dequacies of the current one: targeted vouchers system. It leads to a higher quality 
of the labor force, more efficient allocation of resources and a greater social mobi-
lity. These are possibly just the initial effects of its introduction. The competition 
between private and public universities should cause additional desirable effects in 
the long run, mainly in terms of efficiency and greater quality of the universities.
Other countries also have a higher education sector with the same undesirable 
features of the Brazilian one, such as Argentina, Mexico and Spain. For example, 
public universities in Argentina and Mexico are tuition-free. In Spain, almost 80% 
of the Spanish public universities funds come from the government. In Argentina, 
almost 50% of the public university students belong to the top 20% of the income 
distribution. In Spain, studies indicate that there is an important relationship be-
25 See Holzer and Neumark (2000) for the review of the literature on these and other aspects of 
the effects of affirmative action policies.
Eduardo de carvalho andrade 61
Est. econ., São Paulo, 40(1): 43-66, jan.-mar. 2010
tween an individual's family income and his ability to obtain an university degree.26 
Despite having a higher education sector with its own characteristics, in light of the 
theoretical results for the Brazilian case, these countries should consider changing 
their systems by charging full tuition to those students who can pay. With these 
changes, private universities may emerge and increase the competition in the sector 
with positive effects on the quality of the labor force and the social mobility. The 
introduction of a targeted vouchers system may be a desirable step.
Finally, as voucher allows its beneficiaries to select which university to attend, one 
consequence of its introduction is the shut down of the less competitive public 
universities. In addition, some specific groups have their welfare reduced with 
vouchers in comparison with the current system. It occurs either because the skill 
premium is lower (due to the higher quality of the labor force) or they lose their 
right to attend the tuition free public universities. These two effects combined can 
explain possible oposition to the replacement of the current system by the the more 
efficient targeted vouchers one.
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Appendix A
Proposition 1: Under regime j ( j = f,q,v), there exists a competitive equilibrium 
and it is unique.
Proof. Under regime j, the equilibrium is characterized by five unknows ( , , , 
 and ) and five equations (two first-order conditions of the firm's problem, 
the law of motion for the variable nh,1 and the solutions to both types of individuals' 
problem).27
Let's first examine the quota regime. Departing from the situation in which there 
is only public investment in education and using assumptions 2 e 3, one finds that:
 
In above equation, the RHS is constant. As the LHS is greater than the RHS, indi-
viduals from high income family will invest in private education. The same occurs 
with individuals from low income families if . As a consequence, 
nh,1 and wl,1 increase, and wh,1 decreases. All these changes lead to a reduction in the 
LHS. As , there is one and only one fraction of individuals with high level 
of human capital (and then unique wages and threshold abilities) that equates the 
LHS and the RHS in the above equation.
The proof is similar to the regimes f and v.   
Corollary 1: If , then .
Proof. For any a and , the following inequality holds: (if V0, i = h, l)
 
 
Then .   
Proposition 2:  and  ( j = f,q).
Proof. This proposition is valid with  and . The proof 
is analogous in all possible cases. I show here the case in which low income families 
are not credit constrained ( ) and public universities have a greater 
27 Under regime v,  and  is determined by .
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quality ( ), and compare the targeted vouchers regime with the 
free tutition one.
The following condition must hold in the competitive equilibrium under regime j 
( j = f,q,v):
  (4)
I need to show that  ( ) and . Suppose that 
. Then:
 
 
 
 
 
where , and , the fraction of individuals with high level of 
human capital at t =1 when  and with targeted vouchers, is greater than 
, as the vouchers' recipients are now attending university. As , then 
 and , where  is the wage of individual type i at t = 1 when 
 and with targeted vouchers. It means that the skill premium is lower. 
Hence, the combination  and  do not satisfy equation (4) that 
must hold in the competitive equilibrium under regime v:
 
Hence,  and  are not part of the competitive equilibrium under the 
targeted vouchers regime. To restore equality, the LHS must be greater, that is, 
the ability of those individuals coming from high and low income families must 
be greater, which increases the skill premium (without returning to the previous 
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level, though). Therefore, ,  and . As  
and , then DIFv < DIFf.   
Proposition 3: There is a positive number of targeted vouchers such that 
 ( j = f,q).
Proof. This proposition is valid with  and . The proof is 
analogous in all possible cases. I show here the case in which low income families 
are not credit constrained ( ) and public universities have a greater 
quality ( ), and compare the targeted vouchers regime with the free 
tutition one.
There is a positive number of vouchers that can be distributed to low income families such 
that in the equilibrium: (i) the number of new university students coming from low inco-
me families are exactly equal to the number of students coming from high income families 
whose families decide not to send their children to university anymore (due to the lower 
skill premium), and (ii) the new students (from low income families) have a higher 
quality than the ones who do not attend university anymore (from high income 
families). Due to (i),
 
 
and due to (ii),  . Therefore, .   
Proposition 4: If , then  ( j = f,q) and if 
, then  may be greater, equal or lower than  ( j = f,q).
 Proof. Let's first consider the case in which . Under this condition, 
 is always greater than:
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I = 0,1, j = f,q. Hence, . However, when , 
 if
 
 
( j = f,q).   
